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LYNCHING ETHICS: TOWARD A THEORY
OF RACIALIZED DEFENSES
Anthony V. Alfieri*
"I wonder what people would think if they found a nigger hanging on
Herndon Avenue. "I
INTRODUCMION
So much depends upon a rope in Mobile, Alabama. To hang
Michael Donald, Henry Hays and James "Tiger" Knowles tied up
"a piece of nylon rope about twenty feet long, yellow nylon."'2 They
borrowed the rope from Frank Cox, Hays's brother-in-law. 3 Cox
"went out in the back" of his mother's "boatshed, or something like
that, maybe it was in the lodge."'4 He "got a rope," climbed into the
front seat of Hays's Buick Wildcat, and handed it to Knowles sitting
in the back seat.5
So much depends upon a noose. Knowles "made a hangman's
noose out of the rope,"6 thirteen loops in the knot, thirteen loops
"around" Michael Donald's neck, a "classic hangman's noose."'7 A
hangman's noose "needs to be cut and burned right... so it won't
unravel." 8 Both ends of the rope must be "cut off and burned."9
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law. A.B. 1981, Brown; J.D. 1984, Columbia. - Ed.
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1. Record at 1026, State v. Cox, No. CC-87-2143 (Ala. 1987) [hereinafter Record]. Rec-
ord citations preserve the original text of the trial transcript except where it appears clearly
erroneous or ungrammatical.
2. Record at 1059-60.
3. See id. at 1055, 1059.
4. Id. at 1060.
5. See id. at 1063-64.
6. Id. at 1064.
7. Id. at 742. Morris Dees describes the thirteen loop knot as "standard Klan operating
procedure." See MoRRIs DEnS & STv FmnnER, A SEASON FOR JUSTICE: THm LiFE AND
TimEs OF C .mL Rm)'rs LAWYER Mornas DEES 212 (1991).
8. Record at 1064.
9. Id. at 1069.
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Tightly "pulled up" and left "swinging," Michael Donald's rope
"burned into the bark.' 10
So much depends upon a camphor tree. Hays and Knowles
"went out... driving around looking for someone to kill."" In
East Mobile, "over around David Avenue," they "came on Michael
Donald... kidnapped him and took him to Baldwin County and
killed him, and brought him back to Herndon Avenue and hung
him up" in a tree across the street from Hays's home.12
Early on the morning of March 21, 1981, a man discovered
Michael Donald's mutilated body hanging from a camphor tree on
the 100 block of Herndon Avenue in Mobile, Alabama.13 That
night, members of the United Klans of America, Alabama Realm,
burned a cross on the grounds of the Mobile County Courthouse.14
An autopsy found that Donald had been beaten, stabbed, strangled,
and then "hung up."'15
In 1983, a Mobile County grand jury indicted Hays, the Exalted
Cyclops of the United Klans of America, for capital murder.' 6 At
trial, the jury found Hays guilty and recommended life without pa-
role.17 The trial judge rejected the recommendation of the jury and
sentenced Hays to death.' 8
In 1984, a Mobile County grand jury indicted Cox, also a mem-
ber of the United Klans of America, for conspiracy to commit mur-
der.19 After impaneling a jury and convening the trial, the trial
judge dismissed the indictment and discharged Cox, citing the Ala-
bama three-year statute of limitations for criminal conspiracy.20 In
1987, an Alabama grand jury reindicted Cox for murder.2' Com-
menced in 1988, the initial trial of the murder indictment ended in a
mistrial. Reconvened in 1989, a second trial resulted in a
conviction.2
10. Id. at 742-43.
11. Id. at 1072, 1075.
12. Ld. at 1078-79.
13. See id. at 461-62.
14. See Hays v. State, 518 So. 2d 749, 752 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
15. Record at 740-50, 751.
16. See Hays, 518 So. 2d at 751-52.
17. See 518 So. 2d at 751.
18. See 518 So. 2d at 751.
19. See Cox v. State, 585 So. 2d 182, 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
20. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
21. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
22. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
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Additionally, in 1985 a federal grand jury indicted Knowles, a
third member of the United Klans of America, for violating the civil
rights of Michael Donald.23 Knowles pleaded guilty to civil rights
violations in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Alabama.24 The district court sentenced him to life impris-
onment.25 In return for Knowles's guilty plea and his service as a
State witness against Hays, Cox, and other Klansmen, the federal
prosecutor recommended that Alabama forego concurrent prosecu-
tion of Knowles for capital murder in state court.26
In 1984, the Southern Poverty Law Center,2 7 acting on behalf of
Beulah Mae Donald, the mother of Michael Donald, filed a civil
rights action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama against the United Klans of America, Hays,
Knowles, Cox, and two other Klansmen seeking $10 million in dam-
ages.28 In 1987, a jury found the Klan and its members guilty of
violating Michael Donald's civil rights and awarded Beulah Mae
Donald $7 million in damages.29
In this article, I take up the cause of Henry Hays, James
Knowles, and Frank Cox, the cause of the Ku Klux Klan and other
agents of racial violence in American history. I come to their cause
not out of sympathy but in pursuit of a larger project devoted to the
historical study of race, lawyers, and ethics in the American crimi-
nal justice system. Provoked by the jurisprudence of critical race
theory ("CRT"), 30 the project investigates the rhetoric of race or
"race-talk" in criminal defense advocacy and ethics within the con-
text of racially motivated private violence.31 The purpose of this
long-term project is to understand the status of race, racialized de-
fense strategy, and race-neutral representation in the law and ethics
23. See United States v. Knowle, No. CR83-00028 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
24. See Cox, 585 So. 2d at 185.
25. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
26. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
27. For an augmented history of the Southern Poverty Law Center, see MoRMs DEES &
ST-vE FwFER, HAT ON TRIAL: THE CAsE AGAisr AMERICA'S MOST DANGERous Nao-
NAZI (1993).
28. See DEas & Fu--R, supra note 7, at 222; see also BILL STANTON, KLANWATCH:
BRINGING THm Ku KLUX KLAN TO Jus-rC 191-249 (1991).
29. See DEns & Fw E., supra note 7, at 330-31.
30. See, eg., CRInCAL RAcE THmoRY: THE KEY WIRINGs THAT FomRD THE MOVE-
MENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITCAL RACE THEORY: THE CUMrI G EDGE
(Richard Delgado ed., 1995); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An
Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461 (1993); Symposium, Critical Race Theory, 82
CAt. L. REv. 741 (1994).
31. For discussion of the public-private distinction in the setting of racial violence, see
infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
February 1997] 1065
Michigan Law Review
of criminal defense lawyering. Out of this understanding, I hope,
will come a general theory of racialized defenses grounded in the
normative ideals of moral community.
In a prior work, I searched the rhetoric of race in cases of ra-
cially motivated black-on-white private violence by focusing on the
1993 trial of Damian Williams and Henry Watson in Los Angeles
County Superior Court on charges of attempted murder and aggra-
vated mayhem, stemming from the beating of Reginald Denny and
seven others during the South Central Los Angeles riots of 1992.32
Close inspection of the Williams-Watson trial record suggests that
the rhetorical structure of criminal defense stories of black-on-
white racial violence incorporates competing narratives of deviance
and defiance that engraft an essentialist dichotomy of good-bad
moral character on the racial identity of young black men.33 The
distillation of male racial identity into objective, universal catego-
ries of black manhood distorts the meaning of racial identity and
the image of racial community.3 Moreover, the tendency of crimi-
nal defense lawyers to privilege deviance narratives and to
subordinate defiance narratives in storytelling magnifies that distor-
tion, inscribing the mark of bestial pathology into the texture of
racial identity and community. The American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility3 5 countenance such deformity by allowing
racialized or color-coded criminal defense strategies to survive un-
regulated under neutral accounts of liberal contractarian and com-
munitarian legal theory.36
Calling for remedial regulation in racialized contexts such as the
Williams-Watson trial, I proposed an alternative ethic of profes-
sional responsibility animated by principles of race consciousness,
contingency, and collectivity.3 7 A strong version of this alternative
ethic directs criminal defense lawyers to reject the use of deviance-
based racialized strategies unless such strategies are necessary to
frustrate, by means of jury nullification, a racially discriminatory
prosecution.38 A weak version entreats defense lawyers to join
32. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995).
33. See id. at 1304, 1309.
34. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 800, 801 (1996).
35. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr (1995); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIrLIrY (1980).
36. See Alfieri, supra note 34, at 801; see also Allied, supra note 32, at 1320.
37. See Alfieri, supra note 34, at 802; see also Alfieri, supra note 32, at 1340.
38. See Alfieri, supra note 34, at 802.
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their clients in collaborative deliberation over the meaning of racial
identity and injury within a counseling dialogue devoted to moral
character and community integrity.39
Unsurprisingly, these remedial prescriptions sparked swift and
acute criticism.40 Robin Barnes, for example, denounced the reme-
dial scheme as unprecedented, unworkable, and likely unconstitu-
tional.41 Furthermore, she condemned the underlying interpretive
analysis of the Williams-Watson trial record for mistakenly entan-
gling social and legal strands of race-talk, misjudging the harm in-
flicted upon black racial identity and community, and
misconceiving the criminal defense lawyer's duty to advocate on be-
half of individual client interests, even when preservation of those
interests demands the use of racialized narratives.42 For Barnes, the
eradication of racial prejudice from the criminal justice system ne-
cessitates a regime of legal neutrality, not a regime of race-con-
scious ethics rules.43
Grand intentions notwithstanding, Barnes's dedication to neu-
trality consigns to folly her campaign aimed at purging the criminal
justice system of racial prejudice. In the context of racial violence
and racialized legal discourse, neutrality is not merely elusive, it is
largely untenable. Broadly or narrowly construed, the color-coded
rhetoric of legal discourse affords little chance of or room for neu-
tral speech on matters of racial significance. Moreover, dedication
to neutrality accepts the harms of racial injury as inevitable and,
worse, unremarkable. That the harms are suffered by the victims
and agents of racial violence, as well as by their cohort communi-
ties, seems of no moment to Barnes.
The threshold premise of this article, and its allied research, is
the recognition and condemnation of racial injury within the dis-
tinct, though sometimes overlapping, borders of public and private
violence. The instant turn to racial rhetoric in the circumstance of
white-on-black private violence, specifically in the case of lynching,
strains that border distinction. Gauged by any measure, the polit-
ical violence of lynching seems to override the public-private dis-
tinction commonly posited by legal advocates and adjudicators. Yet
39. See id.
40. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the
Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 788 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the
First Amendment, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REXv. 1030, 1069-70 n.183 (1995).
41. See Barnes, supra note 40, at 789-90, 792.
42. See id. at 789-93.
43. See id. at 791, 794.
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here, tailored carefully to the facts presented in the case of Michael
Donald, the distinction seems to hold and, equally important, to
prove rhetorically and morally instructive.
The enormous breadth of the subject of lynching in America,
spanning two centuries and crossing interdisciplinary boundaries,
coupled with a scarcity of archival court collections, especially trial
records, dictates a somewhat improvisional initial approach to the
rhetoric of lynching cases.44 The starting point, staked out in this
introductory article, is an effort to map competing theories of racial-
ized defenses arising out of lynching prosecutions. Building on this
effort, the next article will survey the varied forms of racialized de-
fenses fashioned against lynching prosecutions. A third article will
chart the development of racialized defenses in lynching-related
civil rights actions. Together, the articles will lay the groundwork
for a fuller account of the history of racialized defenses in Ameri-
can criminal and civil rights law.
To the extent that it assumes a theory-driven posture toward
sociolegal practice, the instant approach will doubtless stir protest.
Detecting an "impatience to theorize," 45 some may condemn the
approach for privileging abstract theoretical design over contextual-
ized reflection.46 To be sure, epistemological hierarchy of any sort
warrants careful scrutiny. The hazards of error and misreading are
always great. But the same hazards attend anthropological, 47 inter-
pretive,48 and empirical49 investigations. No methodology is with-
44. A comprehensive search for archival court records requires the wide-ranging review
of state and county court documents. Two library collections provide useful aid in organizing
such a search: the Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.; and the News Clippings
File of the Tuskegee Institute, Hollis Burke Frissell Library, Tuskegee, Alabama.
45. Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HAs-rmos L.J. 853, 859 (1992).
46. See id.; see also Peter A. Joy, Clinical Scholarship: Improving the Practice of Law, 2
CLINICAL L. REv. 385,402-04 (1996); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive
Poverty Law: A Practice-Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Prac-
tice Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 889 (1995).
47. See CuvoD GEERTZ, AFTER THE FAC. Two CouNTRimEs, FOUR DECADES, ONE
ANTHROPOLOGIST 96-135 (1995); Peter Just, History, Power, Ideology, and Culture: Current
Directions in the Anthropology of Law, 26 LAv & SocY. Rav. 373 (1992) (review essay);
Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between. Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Interdis-
ciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 597.
48. See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: To-
ward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SocY. REv. 197 (1995); Diane Reay, Insider Per-
spectives or Stealing the Words out of Women's Mouths: Interpretation in the Research
Process, 53 FEmST Rav. 57 (1996).
49. See Austin Sarat, Off to Meet the Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the
Search for a Post-empiricist Sociology of Law, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 155 (1990); David M.
Trubek & John Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program,
or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989).
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out peril. Although broad, the project advanced here strives for a
contextual account of the law of criminal lawyering and ethics in
the hope of capturing some sense of the theory and practice of ra-
cial violence in American legal history.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I describes the narra-
tive form and racialized substance of lynching defenses. Part II ex-
amines rival theories of lynching defenses, notably jury
nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity. Part III
analyzes alternative ethical justifications of lynching defenses under
modern and postmodern visions of jurisprudence. Part IV proposes
a reconstructed ethic of lynching defenses informed by the norms of
virtue, citizenship, race consciousness, and spirituality.
I. LYNCHING HISTORIES
The lynching of Michael Donald at the hands of the Ku Klux
Klan sounds themes echoed throughout the history of lynching in
America: difference, hate, violence, and community.50 Plainly, a
full account of that history, and of the place of the Klan in its pro-
gress, 51 exceeds the scope of this article. The main thrust of this
article addresses neither the progress nor the prosecution of lynch-
ing,52 but rather the legal defense of racially motivated violence.
Symbolic of the physical and interpretive violence of race, lynching
and its legal defense raise issues common to the postmodern study
of law and the politics of difference,53 especially the contested poli-
50. On the history of American lynching, see JESSE D. AMES, THE CHANGING CHARAC-
TER OF LYNCrNG (1942); JAMES E. CUTLER, LYNCH-LAW: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES (1905); WALTER WHITE, ROPE & FAGGOT:
A BIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE LYNCH (1929); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE
AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980).
51. Historians divide the evolution of the Ku Klux Klan into three periods corresponding
to the late nineteenth century Reconstruction-era, the post-World War I era of the 1920s,
and the post-World War II era of the civil rights movement. For Reconstruction-era histo-
ries, see DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE FIsT CENTURY OF THE Ku
KLUX KLAN 1865-1965 (1987); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHrrE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN
CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971); WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY
CRoss: THE Ku KLux KLAN IN AMEPCA 31-116 (1987).
On the revival of the Klan in the 1920s, see KATHLEEN M. BLEE, WOMEN OF THE KLAN:
RACISM AND GENDER IN =nm 1920s (1991); NANCY MACLEAN, BEHIIND THE MASK OF CHIV-
ALRY. THE MAKING OF THE SECOND Ku KLUX KLAN (1994).
On the rise of the modem Klan in the post-World War II and civil rights-era, see DAVID
H. BENNETr, THE PARTY OF FEAR: THE AMERICAN FAR RIGHT FROM NATVSM TO THE
MILITA MOVEMENT 273-331 (1995); PATSY Sims, THE KLAN (1978).
52. For a review of lynching prosecutions, see JAMES H. CHADBOURN, LYNCHNG AND
THE LAW 13-24 (1933); EVEREmIE SwINNFY, SUPPRESSING THm Ku KLUx KLAN: THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 1870-1877, at 180-204, 316-40 (1987).
53. On postmodemism and legal practice, see LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:
TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEo. L.J. 2567 (1993).
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tics of the racial trial.54 The legal defense of lynching, for example,
involves the identity-making function of legal narrative,55 the social
construction of race,56 and the culture and cognitive psychology of
bias.57
The product of an apartheid system of rhetorical and spatial
dimensions, the American trial court provides the arena for the in-
tersection of law, lawyering, ethics, and race. An important litera-
ture explores the role of judges and courts in the history of racial
oppression both here58 and abroad.5 9 Curiously, this literature
omits sustained treatment of the complicity of lawyers in legitimiz-
ing the juridical structures (such as law, legal discourse, and institu-
tional procedure) of racial oppression. 60
The emergence of an outsider jurisprudence in the legal acad-
emy during the last decade offers a chance to cure this omission.
Guided by new voices of color 6' probing the connections of law,
race, and identity,62 the jurisprudence is evolving rapidly under the
54. The literature on political trials is extensive. See, eg., POLITICAL TRIALS (Theodore
L Becker ed., 1971); AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981); Georgia
W. Ulmschneider, Rape and Battered Women's Self-Defense Trials as "Political Trials": New
Perspectives on Feminists' Legal Reform Efforts and Traditional "Political Trials" Concepts, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 85 (1995).
55. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Les-
sons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J 2107 (1991).
56. See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observa-
tions on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
57. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Steven L. Winter, Transcen-
dental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105 (1989).
58. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
59. See, e.g., STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH
AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992); Martin Chanock, Criminological Science and the
Criminal Law on the Colonial Periphery: Perception, Fantasy, and Realities in South Africa,
1900-1930, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 911 (1995).
60. Noteworthy exceptions concern lawyer complicity in the Nazi and South African state
regimes. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of
Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989); Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South
Africa, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 407 (1995).
61. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991).
62. For studies of racial identity, see JUnY SALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK
WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY (1995); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241 (1991); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995); Mad J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Ac-
cent, Antidiscrimination Law and A Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.
1329 (1991); Francisco Valdez, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: A Meditation on Iden-
tity and Inter-Connectivity, 5 S. CAL REV. L & WOMEN'S STUD. (forthcoming 1996); Mary
Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 2 AFR.-AM. L. & POLY. REP. 222 (1995) (book review). See
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prodding of CRT,63 Asian,64 and LatCrit scholars.65 The advent of
the CRT and fledgling LatCrit movements dislodges the tradition-
ally subordinate position of race and ethnicity in American law and
ethics. Thus dislodged, the meaning of color in black,66 Asian,67
Latino/a,68 and Native American 69 advocacy takes on new and un-
settled import. This instability enables critical scholars to reassess
the written and social texts of the law exhibited in the courtroom. 70
Textual reassessment implicates narrative71 and discourse theory,72
and thereby highlights the rhetoric of the criminal trial.73
Reimagining the rhetoric of racialized advocacy andethics at trial
or in the law office creates transformative opportunities to move
generally AFTER IDENTrrY. A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE (Dan Danielsen & Karen
Engle eds., 1995).
63. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-
Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAt. L. REv. 787
(1994); Angela P. Harris, Foreword.- The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv.
741 (1994); Eleanor Marie Brown, Note, The Tower of Babek Bridging the Divide Between
Critical Race Theory and "Mainstream" Civil Rights Scholarship, 105 YALE L.J. 513 (1995).
64. See, eg., Robert S. Chang, Toward, an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL L. REv. 1243 (1993); Jim
Chen, Unloving, 80 IowA L. REv. 145 (1994).
65. See, e.g., Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Perspective in
Legal Discourse, 1 HARv. LATINO L. REv. (forthcoming 1996); Symposium, Latinaslos, Lat-
Crit Theory and the 21st Century, 85 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
66. Compare Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 1745 (1989) with Colloquy: Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 103 HAIv. L. REV. 1844 (1990).
67. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African Americani
Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581
(1993).
68. See Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While
Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HArV. WOMEN'S LJ. 185 (1994).
69. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31
Aniz. L. REv. 237 (1989); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race
Practice, 95 MrcH. L. REv. 741 (1997).
70. See, eg., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in-the
Adversarial Criminal Process - A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal
for Reform, 32 AM. CiAM. L. REV. 743 (1995);'Cara W, Robertson, Representing "Miss Liz-
zie": Cultural Convictions in the Trial of Lizzie Borden, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 351 (1996).
71. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case
Theory, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 485 (1994); Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in the
Citadel and VM1 Litigation, 19 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1996).
72. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text To-
wards an Ethnography of Legal DiscoUrse 77 CoRNELL L REv. 1298 (1992); Herbert A.
Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J.
763 (1995).
73. For studies of criminal trial rhetoric, see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy
Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. '55 (1992); Philip
N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences upon a Defendant's Closing Argument
to a Jury 18 VT. L. REv. 721 (1994).
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legal practice toward an appreciation of the importance of racial
identity and community.
Consider the idea of the racialized defense. By racialized, I
mean a defense coded, overtly or covertly, in the rhetoric of color.
Garnered from interdisciplinary research on race and the criminal
law process,74 judicial reports of racial and ethnic bias in the court-
room,75 and the writings of CRT76 and ethics 77 scholars, color-
coded claims and defenses pervade the sociolegal discourse of
American law, culture, and society. The resurgence of the black
rage defense 78 and the emergence of the variegated cultural de-
fense79 reflects the protean nature of that discourse. Taken to-
gether, these defenses illustrate the intertwined character of legal
and social discourse about race.
Alluding to this entwined quality, Alan Hunt observes "that
legal life and everyday social life are mutually conditioning and
constraining and that elements of legal consciousness play an active
part in popular consciousness and practices." 80 To Hunt, law "en-
ters into the way that life is imagined, discussed, argued about, and
fought over."8' The act of "imagining, talking, arguing, and fight-
74. See generally CORAMAE R. MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE - A QUESTION OF COLOR
(1993); MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN NEGLECr - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995).
75. See, e.g., Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Judicial
System, Report of the Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Judi-
cial System, 73 OR. L. Rv. 823 (1995); Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task
Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEo. LJ. 1657, 1893 (1996). See generally Todd
D. Peterson, Studying the Impact of Race and Ethnicity in the Federal Courts, 64 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 173 (1996).
76. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Baye.
sians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1994).
77. See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1 (1994); Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers
of the Court. Why the First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic
Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmICS 781 (1996).
78. See Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L.
Rv. 731 (1996). See generally WILuAm H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968).
79. See, eg., Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36
(1995); Alison D. RenteIn, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 437 (1993); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women
and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV. WoMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994).
80. Alan Hunt, Law, Community, and Everyday Life: Yngvesson's Virtuous Citizens and
Disruptive Subjects, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 173, 178-79 (1996) (reviewing BARBARA
YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRuPTIVE SuBEcrs: ORDER AND COMPLAINT IN A
NEw ENGLAND COURT (1993)).
81. Id. at 179.
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ing" in turn "shapes the law."'82 In this way, the racialized organiza-
tion of law, lawyering, and ethics infects and, conversely, is infected
by the racialized composition of popular culture and everyday so-
cial life in America.83 The fusion of racialized legal and social dis-
course is not simply confined to high-profile cases.8 4
The prominence of the racialized defense in contemporary soci-
olegal discourse underscores the crucial function of narrative and
storytelling in criminal law and lawyering. Dismantling racialized
storytelling in a criminal context reveals two core presuppositions
that shape the traditional criminal defense paradigm: partisanship
and nonaccountability.8 5 The precepts of client partisanship and
moral nonaccountability spawn discrete rhetorical forms of color-
coded narrative. The play of narrative, Rebecca French notes,
"breaks open a discipline by creating new linguistic and representa-
tional forms. ' 86 Here, the focus is on the racialized criminal court-
room, its race-neutral ethical precepts, and its color-coded narrative
forms.
The examination of racialized courtroom narratives requires an
analysis of hierarchy and status in legal rhetoric. Consider the rhet-
oric of colorblind constitutionalism. The colorblindness trope87 is
basic to the discourse of American law and jurisprudence. Yet, in-
sofar as it denies the social significance of racial categories, it pre-
82. Id.
83. See generally RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANrrA HILL,
CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE CONSTRUCION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992).
84. See Adeno Addis, "Hell Man, They Did Invent Us". The Mass Media, Law and Afri-
can Americans, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 523 (1993); Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making
of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965, 967-70 (1995).
85. See Alfieri, supra note 32, at 1321.
86. Rebecca R. French, Of Narrative in Law and Anthropology, 30 LAW & Soc,. REv.
417, 421 (1996) (review essay). Explicating these narrative forms, French remarks:
In this period of late or postmodernism, single-person narrative is viewed as a safe and
effective technique both for avoiding false generalizations that might be attacked (the
false coherence of essentialist stereotypes) and for creating a new form of social science
that includes, instead of dismisses, multiplicity and diversity.
Id. at 419; see also Benjamin L. Apt, Aggadah, Legal Narrative; and the Law, 73 OR. L. REv.
943, 968 (1995) ("Legal narrative often attempts to expose the shortcomings of current laws
and reveal the effect of laws on society.").
87. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv.
1060 (1991); Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to
the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1995).
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serves racial hierarchy and status inequality.8 8 In this respect,
colorblind rhetoric operates as a "status-preserving" 89 discourse.
The law of lawyering which governs the criminal defense of ra-
cial violence in lynching cases also constitutes a status-preserving
discourse. In practical effect, it protects the racial hierarchy of
white dominance and black subordination embedded in the racial-
ized narratives of American law, culture, and society. Within fed-
eral and state courtrooms, this status hierarchy appears legitimate
and nondiscriminatory.
This legitimacy rests in part on the rhetoric of colorblindness.
Cloaked in this rhetoric, the Model Code and the Model Rules con-
done the use of racialized narrative in criminal defense advocacy.
Construing the law of lawyering as a racial status law and its lan-
guage as a status-preserving discourse challenges the race-neutral
standing of the Model Code and the Model Rules. Central to this
challenge is an explanation of precisely how legal rules covertly en-
force status privileges "once justified in overtly hierarchy-based dis-
courses, with reference to other, less contested, social values," 90
such as citizenship and community.
II. LYNCHING DEFENSES
Lynching defenses embody a distinct narrative form of the
racialized defense. This Part considers three varieties of lynching
defenses: jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished ca-
pacity. The defenses of jury nullification and victim denigration
make overt use of hierarchy-based racial discourse. Nullification
rhetoric invokes the power and prerogative of white racial
supremacy. Denigration rhetoric conjures up a vision of black ra-
cial inferiority where victims are worthy of killing but unworthy of
protection or redress. The defense of diminished capacity, by con-
trast, makes covert use of hierarchical racial discourse through ref-
erence to the social values of community and civic virtue. For white
lawbreakers, civic commitment lies only to segregated community.
The racial hierarchies encoded in the rhetoric of nullification,
denigration, and diminished capacity denote difference in legal and
social status. The elaboration of difference follows the logic of ad-
88. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice HabiN4 83 CAL. L. REv. 733 (1995).
89. The term belongs to Reva Siegel. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.. 2117,2185 (1996).
90. Id. at 2177.
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versarial justice,91 sharply distinguishing and dividing claims of
community racial entitlement into oppositional stands. Despite
complaints of excess, the model of adversarial justice expressly tol-
erates deceptive and sometimes false or frivolous claims.92 Bound
up in false hierarchies of natural superiority and inferiority, the nar-
rative signification of racial difference is likewise tolerated.
The reconfiguration of difference-based racial hierarchy re-
quires alteration of the signifying function of lynching defenses. Al-
teration may be accomplished through either nonreflexive or
reflexive approaches to the law of criminal lawyering.93 A
nonreflexive, or discretionary, approach draws upon traditions of
lawyer independence to disavow racialized strategies. This unilat-
eral approach conceives of the criminal defense lawyer as an unbri-
dled moral activist. A reflexive or collaborative approach appeals
to civic republican traditions to encourage lawyer-client delibera-
tions of racial identity, moral character, and dialogic community.
This bilateral approach restores the Brandeisian vision of "socially
responsible advocacy."94
Both discretionary and collaborative approaches to criminal
lawyering reaffirm the bonds that link the criminal law to moral
character95 and community. To prevail, however, reaffirmation
must confront the ascending rhetoric of excuse in criminal defense
91. For deft exposition of this logic, see David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in
THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' E-mcs 83 (David Luban ed., 1983);
see also Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary Sys-
tem?, 79 CAL. L. Rnv. 313 (1991).
92. See R.J. Gerber, Victory v. Truth. The Adversary System & Its Ethics, 19 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 3 (1987); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NOTRE DAME L. RFv. 403 (1992). Compare Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Differ-
ent Mission": Reflections on the "Right" To Present a False Case, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL E-mucs
125 (1987) with John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Re-
sponse to Professor Subin's Position on the Crimina Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETmIcs 339 (1987).
93. Jack Balkin suggests two approaches to ideological demystification: nonreflexive and
reflexive. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE LJ. 1935 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SuNsmnTr, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH (1993)). According to Balkin, a nonreflexive approach "sees ordinary citizens
as suffering from a pathology, a defect that needs to be cured through the analyst's exper-
tise." Id. at 1984. A reflexive approach, by comparison, "understands the relationship be-
tween the analyst and analysand as a disagreement about what is good, a disagreement that
may be due to misunderstandings and ideological blinders on both sides." Id. at 1984-85.
94. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE L. 1445, 1471 (1996).
95. See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Charac-
ter to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, Soc. PnL. & POLY., Spring 1990, at 59; Samuel H.
Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Re-
sponsibility, 67 IND. LJ. 719 (1992).
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advocacy.96 Interweaving gender,97 race,98 and the social environ-
ment,99 the concept of excuse limits individual blame and collective
accountability. 00 At the same time, it implicates the meaning of
shame and shaming. 01
Dan Kahan defines shame in terms of disgrace. Shame, accord-
ing to Kahan, is "the emotion that a person experiences when she
believes that she has been disgraced in the eyes of persons whom
she respects."' 2 As such, it illuminates the conjunction of culture,
community, and the criminal justice system. 0 3
Lynching defenses encourage cultural and community resistance
to shame10 4 by inviting collective defiance of legal and nonlegal
sanctions. 05 The defenses urge the renunciation of shame in favor
of sympathy for white lawbreakers.106 Instead of commonality with
96. See R. JAY WALLACE, REsPONSIBILrY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 118-53 (1994);
Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY. 1 (1995); Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers:
Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 671 (1988); Michael
S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1985).
97. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 3 (1994); Deborah W.
Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80
(1994).
98. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GO=Tz AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).
99. See K.D. HARRIES, CRIME AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1980); Richard Delgado, "Rotten
Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEo. J. 9 (1985).
100. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1511 (1992).
101. See JOHN BRAITIIWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); GABRIELE
TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GuILr. EMOTONS OF SELF-AssESSMENT 53-84 (1985); John
Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1993); Dan M. Kahan, What
Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHL L. REV. 591, 630-52 (1996).
102. Kahan, supra note 101, at 636 (footnote omitted).
103. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame; Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1880 (1991).
104. See Martha Craven Nussbaum, Shame Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's
Criticism of Plato, in ESSAYS ON AmSTOTE'S ETICS 395,427 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed.,
1980) (finding merit in the centrality of "character-friendship" within the Aristotelian polis,
especially in its "capacity for refining self-criticism through emulation and the sense of
shame" (footnote omitted)).
105. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHL L. REV. 133 (1996).
106. Segregated pronouncements of racial sympathy mark the loss of Gordon Wood's
notion of a "modem humanitarian sensibility." For Wood, that loss implies the abandonment
of the Jeffersonian belief in the equality of the moral worth and authority of every individual.
Abandonment of this ideal, he cautions, poses a threat to civil society. See Gordon S. Wood,
Thomas Jefferson, Equality, and the Creation of a Civil Society, 64 FORDH-AM L. REV. 2133,
2141-42 (1996); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION (1991).
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people or communities of color, the defenses incite separation and
detachment.
A. Jury Nullification
The racialized defense of jury nullification binds communities to
racial difference and subordination. Construed as an expression of
community moral sentiment, nullification seeks to rectify perceived
inequalities of racial status.107 Out of deference to the subordinate
racial status of black jurors and defendants, Paul Butler explains
that nullification occurs when a jury harbors objections to a law
either on its face or as applied to a particular defendant and, ac-
cordingly, "disregards evidence presented at trial and acquits an
otherwise guilty defendant."108 Borrowing Butler's formulation for
the purpose of upending it, the theory of jury nullification pro-
pounded here licenses white jurors to "approach their work cogni-
zant of its political nature and their prerogative to exercise their
power in the best interests" of the white community.10 9
Nullification defense strategies recognize race as a rhetorical
presence in criminal jury selection and deliberation." 0  Recent
literature on the criminal jury' confirms the magnitude of this
presence. Race taints jury selection" 2 notwithstanding the diverse
demographic factors impinging on the process of voir dire." 3 Simi-
larly, race contaminates jury deliberation in spite of the constitu-
107. On racial bias in criminal trials, including the determination of guilt, see Shari Lynn
Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1611 (1985).
108. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995). Butler adds:
Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is guilty of
the crime with which he is charged. In finding the defendant not guilty, the jury refuses
to be bound by the facts of the case or the judge's instructions regarding the law. In-
stead, the jury votes its conscience.
Id.
109. Id. at 715.
110. Cf. Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argumen 44 J. LEGAL EDUC
566, 577 (1994).
111. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY. TiE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 99-141, 207-39 (1994); NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS'
NoTIONS OF THE LAW 172-95 (1995).
112. See Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Where Did Black Jurors Go? A Theoretical Synthesis of
Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selectior, in READING RACISM AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSrICE SYSTEM 87-100 (David Baker ed., 1994); Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W.
Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NATL.
BLACK L.J. 238 (1994).
113. See Chris F. Denove & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Jury Selection: An Empirical Inves-
tigation of Demographic Bias, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 285 (1995).
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tional aspiration of political insulation and cross-sectional
community representation.114
For the white defender of black lynching, the criminal jury trial
provides a forum for citizen political participation aimed at curing
the problem of white political, social, and economic disenfranchise-
ment.115 Deployed as an "audience-based theory of argument," 116
nullification rhetoric imbues the racialized speech found in opening
and closing statements, direct and cross examinations, and even ob-
jections. The rhetoric vocalizes the political astonishment"7 of the
white community toward lynching prosecutions. For defenders of
that community, the ethical task is to'"distinguish between what can
be said and what cannot be said" 1 8 in the service of racial
supremacy.
The evidence of community astonishment apparent in jury nulli-
fication points to an entrenched sociolegal consciousness of racial
hierarchy. Demonstrated in public through the media 1 9 and in pri-
vate through talk of conspiracy or hoax, 20 hierarchy-instilled racial
consciousness molds the sociolegal reality of the criminal law. The
rhetorical stratagems of prosecution and defense teams reflect that
reality.' 21 The constitution of the racialized self and racial commu-
114. See Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841 (1976);
Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a Community Voice: The Case for Half-and-Half Juries in
Racially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28 J. MARSHALL L. Rnv. 1 (1994); see also Marina Angel,
Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills A Jury of Her Peers Who
Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CtIm. L. REv. 229 (1996).
115. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CoRNEL L. REv. 203 (1995).
116. Saunders, supra note 110, at 577.
117. Cf Louis E. Wolcher, The Man in a Room: Remarks on Derrida's Force of Law, 7
LAW &.CRm uE 35, 40 (1996).
118. Id. at 63.
119. See Susan F. Hirsch, Interpreting Media Representation of a "Night of Madness":
Law and Culture in the Construction of Rape Identities, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1023 (1994).
120. See Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71
IN .L.J. 593 (1996); see also Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils: An-
tiblack Conspiracy Theorizing & The Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1021
(1995).
121. See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting
"Apparent Innocence" in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. Cuim. L. REv. 1, 36 (1995).
Pilcher remarks that:
[C]riminal prosecution serves a broadly educational function as well as an individually
punitive one: public views of blameworthiness are significantly influenced by what is
prosecuted, just as what is criminalized is influenced by public disapproval. Provided the
enforced norm is perceived as morally legitimate, and the violator thus blameworthy, the
norm is internalized and accrues power as a socializing force. Criminal enforcement in
the absence of socialization of the norm, however, can have the opposite effect; if the
public would not collectively react to violation of the norm with condemnation then the
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nity mirrors the same reality.'22 Forged from the hierarchical ten-
sion of racial status domination and subordination, both the self
and community suffer from the deformities of negation.
B. Victim Denigration
The racialized defense of victim denigration rests on the nega-
tion of racial identity in law and culture.123 Negation fragments ra-
cial identity24 and scatters deformed images throughout the
criminal process.125 Criminal* defense lawyers employ this imagery
in the "elaboration of difference. 1 26 Racial difference establishes
the predicate for the segregation of the white self and the black
other. Lynching defenders seek to enforce racial segregation by af-
firming the status of the white lawbreaker and demeaning the body
of the black victim. 127
particular prohibition has no distinctive social power. This, in turn, fosters the dimin-
ished respect for the law ...
Id.
122. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas O'Fallon Memorial Lecture on
Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR L. REV. 423, 430-(1995). ("For appropriate self-constitu-
tion, both strong attachment to context and strong possibilities for detachment from context
are needed. Because these requirements seem to oppose each other, they exist in tension.
This tension causes problems for theory and contradictory tendencies in practice.").
123. See JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, WHITE ON BLACK: IMAGES OF AFRICA AND
BLACKs IN WEsTERN PoprmL.Sn CULTURE 51-63, 132-41,152-56,174-78 (1992); see also Adele
Logan Alexander, "She's No Lady, She's a Nigger": Abuses, Stereotypes, and Realities from
the Middle Passage to Capitol (and Anita) Hill, in RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA:
THE LEGACY OF THE Hiu.L-THoMAs HEARINGs 3 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan
eds., 1995); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Hill-Thomas Hearings - What Took Place and
What Happened: White Male Domination, Black Male Domination, and the Denigration of
Black Women, in RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-
THOMAS HEARINGS, supra, at 26.
124. See Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves". Securing Black People's Right to Shop
and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147; Erika L. Johnson, "A Menace To
Society:" The Use of Criminal Profiles and Its Effects on Black Males, 38 HowARD L.J. 629
(1995).
125. See Kevin Brown, The Social Construction of a Rape Victim: Stories of African-
American Males About the Rape of Desiree Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 997; Ariela
Gross, Pandora's Box: Slave Character on Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 267 (1995); Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law:
The Relationship Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in
Southern Antebellum and Modern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOKL L. REv. 1165 (1995); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1739 (1993); Lawrence
Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial
Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (1993).
126. See Chanock, supra note 59, at 935 (discussing the "elaboration of difference"
through law).
127. Modem criminal law jurisprudence discloses a growing interest in the position of the
victim. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMs' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRiAus (1995); Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1596 (1996) (reviewing FLETCHER, supra).
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The denigration defense centers on the racially subordinate sta-
tus of black victims. 128 Affirning this unequal status renews long
standing claims of moral, physical, mental, and genetic inferiority.
The claims provide the historical rationale not only for lynching,
but also for eugenic segregation and sexual sterilization. 129 They
also supply the basis for assigning qualities of bad or immoral char-
acter to black victims.
To lynching defenders, black victims possess immoral character.
Infirmities of character render such victims undeserving of privacy
or dignity. The deterioration of victim-specific privacy interests at-
tends the steady collapse of the boundary line separating public
from private realms in law and liberal theory. Calling upon the
state for juridical vindication hastens that collapse.130 State action,
in a significant sense, propels the victim of private violence into a
public role.
Acting in concert with the state, criminal defense lawyers frame
the identity of victims in the public sphere of the courtroom. 131
Framing in advocacy causes revictimization in death. Like victim
impact statements, victim denigration statements "permit, and in-
deed encourage, invidious distinctions about the personal worth of
victims."' 32 Such distinctions, Susan Bandes comments, contradict
the principle of moral equality in the criminal law.133
Increasingly embroiled in Supreme Court jurisprudence, 34
victim-related statements demonstrate the force of moral passion
and emotion embedded in racialized defenses. 3S The racially im-
passioned rhetoric of victim denigration demands judgments of nar-
128. See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Blac, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988);
Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127 (1987).
129. See EDWARD J. LARSON, SEx, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SouTH
(1995); Edward J. Larson, "In the Finest, Most Womanly Way:" Women in the Southern
Eugenics Movement, 39 AM. J. LaGAL HisT. 119 (1995).
130. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Welfare, 72 Daiv. U. L. REv. 931, 941 (1995) ("The sphere of privacy protected by
liberal rights largely evaporates once the individual invites in state assistance.").
131. See generally Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 277
(1993); Patricia Y. Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the "Second Assault" Legal
Organizations' Framing of Rape Victims, 19 LAW & Soc. INOUmY 853 (1994).
132. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 361, 406 (1996).
133. See iL
134. See eg., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
135. See Markus D. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready to
Strike, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 85 (1993); Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991
Sup. CT. REa. 77.
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rative inclusion and exclusion. Bandes describes narrative
judgment as "unavoidably normative" and "value-laden."' 36 In her
view, the issue "is always which narratives we should privilege and
which we should marginalize or even silence."' 37
Victim denigration statements privilege narratives of white in-
nocence and resistance antagonistic to black identity and the corol-
lary value of black self-esteem. 38 The narratives reproduce racial
hierarchies of moral worth, emphasizing the role of black depravity
even at death. Denigration rhetoric of this kind ventures to estab-
lish an "empathetic link"' 39 between white lawbreakers and white
jurors, thereby coloring the judgment of culpability.140 In the same
way, the diminished capacity rhetoric of racial delusion seeks out
the empathetic ratification of segregated community.
C. Diminished Capacity
The racialized defense of diminished capacity combines commit-
ment, community, and delusion to free white lawbreakers of moral
and criminal culpability. Freedom follows from the commitment to
segregated community. Heralded in the case of lynching, that com-
136. Bandes adds:
Once we acknowledge the instrumental, political nature of legal narrative, we can enter
the difficult discussions of why marginalization of some narratives occurs, how to sepa-
rate the wrongly excluded narratives from those that ought to be excluded, how to in-
clude the wrongly marginalized narratives in legal discourse, and how to ensure that they
are actually heard.
Bandes, supra note 132, at 387-88 (footnotes omitted).
137. Id. at 409. Death penalty abolitionists, for example, urge the silencing of victim
impact narratives on the ground that they "incline the sentencer in favor of death, thus im-
pugning the reliability of the jury's decision as an objective benchmark of the evolving stan-
dards [of decency]." Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional
Construct: The Supreme Court's Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23
HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 455, 520 (1996). The resultant death sentences, accordingly, "are
invalid gauges of societal standards of decency and should be given little probative force in
the constitutionality determination." Id. at 521.
138. For a discussion of self-esteem and related values, see Roy L. Brooks, Analyzing
Black Self-Esteem in the Post-Brown Era, 4 TEMPLE POL & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 215, 217
(1995). Brooks defines self-esteem in terms of two components. The first, called specific or
personal self-esteem, "measures an individual's belief in his or her own virtue and moral self-
worth." Id. The second, called personal efficacy, "reflects a sense of personal competence,
efficacy, or control." Id.
139. Bandes explains:
More often, the difficulty for the trier of fact is in making the empathetic link with the
defendant, in seeing the defendant's shared humanity. In either situation, though, the
real importance of empathy lies in its counternarrative aspect - it enables the trier of
fact to imagine himself in the place of another.
Bandes, supra note 132, at 377.
140. Cf. Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors' Responses to Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in
Sexual Assault Trials, 32 Soc. PROBs. 389 (1985); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Run-
ner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1201 (1992).
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mitment triggers the diminished capacity defense. Proponents of
the defense contend that the extreme nature of white commitment
to community-wide racial supremacy induces a state of mind bor-
dering on delusion. Thus misguided, white lawbreakers perform
acts of racial violence without individual or collective remorse.
Like jury nullification and victim denigration, the defense of di-
minished capacity illustrates the pivotal role of counsel in perpetu-
ating racial violence. The defense directs counsel to put the white
lawbreaker's state of mind in legal controversy. It is counsel's duty
to assert client claims of diminished capacity and incompetency,
whether attributable to emotional disturbance or to insanity. 141
The claim of racial delusion satisfies that duty.142
Excusing white lawbreakers from liability on the ground of
delusion-inducing racial emotion dilutes the moral force of criminal
defense advocacy. Emotion is fundamental to this dilution. 143 The
diminished capacity defense depicts white lawbreakers caught up in
the emotion of populist resistance.144 Discarding the image of
white savagery, the defense offers the alternative impression of
white innocence, an innocence filled with a commitment to commu-
nity solidarity. Comparable to duress,145 this commitment to soli-
darity brings to bear elements of psychological and physical
coercion upon individuals enmeshed in the culture of white
supremacy,146 recasting violence as "prejudiced irrationality."'1 47
The image of the community-minded white innocent evokes
race and the racial body. Tami Spry speaks of "the body that is
visible as a cultural symbol.' 48 The diminished capacity defense
141. See eg., Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Represent-
ing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis.
L. REv. 65.
142. See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76
B.U. L. REv. 113 (1996).
143. On the role of emotion in criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
144. For an example of the populist justification for lynching, see the description in
Nancy MacLean, The Leo Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Mak-
ing of Reactionary Populism, 78 J. AM. thST. 917, 920, 943-44 (1991).
145. See generally JosHuA DREssER , UNDEgsrANDING CRIMINAL LAW 259-73 (1987);
Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331 (1989).
146. Cf. David S. Rutkowski, A Coercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging
the Moral Gap in Existing Law, 10 NoTRE DAME J.L. Ermcs & PUB. POLY. 137 (1996).
147. The phrase originates with Kathryn Abrams. See Kathryn Abrams, 77tle VII and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 2479, 2524 (1994).
148. Tami Spry, In the Absence of Word and Body: Hegemonic Implications of "Victim"
and "Survivor" in Women's Narratives of Sexual Violence, 18 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 27, 29
(1995) (emphasis omitted).
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puts forward the black body as a cultural object. According to this
defense, the killing of the black body, indeed the act of lynching
itself, constitutes an act of empowerment, an act of human agency
vital to the identity construction of the white self and the white
community. The defense prevails despite its intimation of social
pathology.149
The modem jurisprudence of the criminal law supports the
claim of racial violence as pathology.150 In its current rendition, the
claim suggests that the presence of racially coercive' 51 pathology
negates the free wil152 and responsibility153 of the white law-
breaker. 54 This reading, however, ffips the standard legal dichot-
omy of agent-victim or perpetrator-victim on its head.155 Kathryn
Abrams explains that "the categories of perpetrator and victim are
understood to be simple and unitary: the perpetrator enjoys full
agency, and the victim either lacks as a categorical matter, or loses
through the experience of discrimination, virtually all capacity for
self-direction."' 56 Yet, under the racial delusion defense of agent-
as-victim, it is the white perpetrator who lacks the cognitive capac-
ity for independent moral direction and the black victim who invites
racial retribution. Discordantly, in a manner akin to disability and
incompetence, this cognitive impairment actually warrants greater
lawyer solicitousness 57 precisely because it renders moral con-
science and punishment irrelevant. 58
149. Kathryn Abrams cites a similar tension experienced by women's defense lawyers
attempting to navigate "between the need to defend battered women who kill (often through
the use of defenses such as 'learned helplessness') and the need for battered women, and
women as a group, to project an image reflecting some capacity for agency." Kathryn
Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New Patterns in the Search for
Equality, 57 U. Prrr L. REv. 337, 362 n.104 (1996).
150. On pathology and criminal law, see Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEo.
L.J. 527 (1996).
151. On coercion, see ALAN WERTHEImER, COERCION 144-75 (1987).
152. For a discussion of the metaphysics of volition, see MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND
CRiME: THm PmLosoPHY oF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 113-65
(1993).
153. See generally Wallace, supra note 96, at 51-83; Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of
Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245 (1992).
154. Cf. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1882-85 (1996).
155. See Abrams, supra note 149, at 348.
156. Id. at 348; see also Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Femi-
nist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 324-29 (1995).
157. See Jeff McMahan, Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice, 25 PHIL & PUB.
Ass. 3, 35 (1996) (claiming "indirect or derivative moral reasons to be specially solicitous
about the well-being of the cognitively impaired").
158. See Stephen . Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1587, 1634-37
(1994).
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Deriving a lynching defense from the social-psychology of racial
delusion privatizes the social issue of racism. Privatization ignores
the social undercurrents of hate crime in America. 159 The move
from the public to the private sphere, and the corresponding shift
from moral evil to scientific pathology, allows the legal profession
to evade responsibility for its complicity in maintaining racial
violence.
III. LYNCHING ETHICS
Lynching ethics describes the normative system that criminal
lawyers employ to justify the racialized defenses of jury nullifica-
tion, victim denigration, and diminished capacity. Reassembled
here from modern and postmodem conceptions of criminal defense
representation, that value system sacrifices collective moral deliber-
ation as a regulative ideal160 to the zealous advancement of individ-
ual freedom.16' Indeed, the systematic objective of criminal
defense advocacy is to preserve individual client freedom. Conven-
tionally, freedom comprises both positive and negative rights. Yet,
for the criminal defendant, negative rights acquire principal empha-
sis in erecting a bulwark against state encroachment upon political
and civil liberties.
To ensure the preservation of ordered liberties, defense attor-
neys seek to establish more stringent standards of state conduct in
criminal cases. 162 To that end, they espouse the principles of liberal
legalism and the rhetoric of rights. 63 The presumption of inno-
159. See generally JACK LavmN & JACK McDEvrrT, HATE CRIMEs: TiE Rismo TIDE OF
BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED (1993); Lu-rN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW (1996); James B. Jacobs
& Jessica S. Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic, 86 J. CRuM. L. &
CRMINOLOGY 366 (1996); Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Nor-
mative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REv. 320 (1994).
160. On Kantian moral deliberation, see Paul Guyer, The Value of Agency, 106 ETucs
404, 405-20 (1996) (book review).
161. For a discussion of liberty as either a collective social reaction or an elite ideology,
see Warren Sandmann, The Argumentative Creation of Individual Liberty, 23 HAsTNas
CONST. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996). "
162. Barton Ingraham explains:
The most common rationalization given for the higher and stricter standards and
rules in criminal cases is the greater severity of its sanctions (punishments) as well as its
social consequences (stigma, disrepute). Another common rationalization is the greater
need in criminal cases for protection of the individual against the massive forces and
resources of the state.
Barton L. Ingraham, The Right of Silence, the Presumption of Innocence, the Burden of
Proof, and a Modest Proposa" A Reply to O'Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 559, 574
(1996).
163. French explains: "Rights talk, which points toward rules and principles and cur-
rently has great moral weight, is based on a story about the relationship between the state
and its component individuals just as individual narratives are." French, supra note 86, at 426.
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cence, the right to remain silent, and the burden of state proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt'64 all testify to the strength of liberalism in
asserting private rights against the state and its penal incursions.
Grasping the injunction of zealous criminal defense advocacy
requires engagement with liberal theory, particularly its vision of
state power, corruption, and malice. Consistent with the tradition
of liberal political theory, David Luban attributes state power, and
its abuse, to advantages in police and prosecutorial resources, crimi-
nal procedure, political legitimacy, and bargaining position. 65
Based on this balance of state advantages, Luban recommends the
professional norm of zealous advocacy to criminal defense law-
yers.166 Nonetheless, suspicious of presumptive absolutes, he warns
that this role-derived norm is rebuttable. 67
Luban's broadly framed version of the zealous advocacy defense
contrasts sharply with William Simon's narrowly tailored formula-
tion168 Simon rejects the categorical use of zealous advocacy in the
criminal sphere, endorsing only the selective use of aggressive de-
fense tactics when warranted by substantive justice objections to
unjustly harsh or discriminatory punishment, especially if traceable
to political disenfranchisement. 69 That categorical rejection
evinces a fundamental disagreement over the meaning and require-
ment of deception in criminal defense advocacy. For Luban, crimi-
nal defense advocacy necessitates deceptive defense tactics. 70 For
Simon, deception imperils the moral self-conception of defense law-
yers and, consequently, risks alienation and loss of moral
integration. 71
Deception is central to the ideology and practice of racialized
defenses. Although generally absent from accounts of the motiva-
tions of criminal defense lawyers, 172 deception permeates the advo-
164. See generally Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens
of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1301 (1977).
165. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 ihcr. L. REv. 1729, 1730-
52 (1993).
166. See id. at 1755-57.
167. See id. at 1757-58; see also DAvm LuB a, LAWYERS AND JusrIcE: AN ETMCAL
STuDy 129-33 (1988).
168. See William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1703,1703
(1993).
169. See id. at 1724-25.
170. See Luban, supra note 165, at 1760-61.
171. See William H. Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense,
91 MNhc. L. REv. 1767, 1772 (1993).
172. See eg., Roy B. Flemming, If You Pay the Piper, Do You Call the Tune? Public
Defenders in America's Criminal Courts, 14 L. & Soc. INQumY 393 (1989) (book review);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defend-
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cacy function, distorting client identity and condemning the search
for truth, even the contingent truth realized in particularized con-
texts.173 Both modem and postmodern accounts of criminal de-
fense practice renounce the search for truth. Uninterested in the
moral commitments accompanying fragmentary moments of histor-
ical truth, the accounts find relevance only in the machinery of ad-
versarial justice.
A. The Modernist Justification
The modernist justification of racialized defenses hinges on law-
yer commitment to the institutional values of the adversarial sys-
tem. Performing within this system, criminal defense lawyers
internalize adversarial norms, meanings, and roles.174 Norm-
internalization, Allan Gibbard explains, "involves tendencies to-
ward action and emotion, tendencies that are coordinated with the
tendencies of others in ways that constitute matched adaptations, or
are the results of matched adaptations."'175
Consider the norm of role-differentiated morality.176 Applied
to the matched prosecution-defense adaptations of the adversarial
system, role-based differentiation severs professional morality from
personal and community morality, enabling the criminal defense
lawyer to serve in the guise of Monroe Freedman's "champion
against a hostile world."'1 77 Rooted in the Sixth Amendment notion
ers, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1239 (1993); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibil.
ity, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc CHANGE 433 (1994).
173. See Richard K Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a
Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REv. 39, 39-43 (1994).
174. See ALLAN GLBBARD, VisE CHoICEs, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE
JUDGmNT 55-82 (1990) (distinguishing between "accepting a norm" and "being in the grip of
a norm"); see also Arthur Isak Applbaum, Professional Detachment: The Executioner of
Paris, 109 HARv. L. REv. 458, 473-86 (1995); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good
Judgment" Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL Eamcs 31, 86 (1995) (urging
restoration of parity between the two modes of norm-adoption: internalization and accept-
ance); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 947 (1996)
(asserting that "people usually do not choose norms, meanings, and roles; all of these are
(within limits) imposed").
175. GIBBARD, supra note 174, at 71.
176. See ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THm MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 20-
33, 155 (1980); David Luban, Introduction to THE ETHmcS OF LAWYERS, at xi, xii-xiv (David
Luban ed., 1994); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
Hum. RTs. 1 (1975).
177. Monroe E. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REv.
331, 332 (1987).
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of adversarial fairness, 178 the norm of role-differentiated morality
commands "fair process" and, by extension, effective counsel.179
The modernist account of lynching ethics defines the role-
derived norm of effective representation in terms of the traditional
axioms of neutral partisanship' 80 and moral nonaccountability.' 8s
Partisanship, Rob Atkinson explains, "entails advancing client ends
through all legal means, and with a maximum of personal determi-
nation, as long as the ends are within the letter of the law."' 82 Neu-
trality, Atkinson adds, "lets the professional claim personal
disinterest in, or even antipathy toward, client ends and moral
nonaccountability for helping to advance them."' 83
The complementary norms of neutral partisanship and moral
nonaccountability envisage criminal law practice as a technical,
apolitical craft.184 The practice of racialized defenses clearly entails
technical expertise. But neither the accumulation nor the applica-
tion of that expertise precludes politics, in this case the identity-
making and community-defining politics of race.
The rhetorical politics of racialized defenses proclaims the
Model Code and the Model Rules colorblind to matters of identity
and community. Declarations of neutrality and neutral princi-
ples,185 however, obscure racial hierarchy. The doctrinal pretense
of impartially tracking evidence of discriminatory intent 8 6 supplies
no resolution to the establishment of racial privilege. And yet, this
178. See, e.g., STEPHEN LANDSMAN, Tim ADvERsARY SYSTEM (1984); Gary Goodpaster,
On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial 78 J. Cram. L. & CRMIw OLOoY 118(1987).
179. See Stephen B. Bright, The Electric Chair and the Chain Gang: Choices and Chal-
lenges for America's Future; 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 845, 851 (1996); Gerald F. Uelmen,
2001: A Train Ride: A Guided Tour of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 58 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter 1995, at 13.
180. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1989) ("A lawyer
should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf."); see also James R. Elkins, The Moral Labyrinth of Zeal-
ous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 735 (1992).
181. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 613; Murray L. Schwartz, The Profession-
alism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673-74 (1978).
182. Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of
The Remains of the Day, 105 YALE LJ. 177, 185 (1995).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 186; Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. Rnv. 3 (1951).
185. See Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 982 (1978); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to
Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1992); Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
186. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Inten4 91 MIciL L. REv. 953 (1993).
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is the answer contained in race-neutral proclamations emanating
from the politics of racial "nonrecognition."' 8 7
This same rhetorical politics pronounces jury nullification, vic-
tim denigration, and diminished capacity as expressions of private
preferences outside the public reach of juridical sanction. Constru-
ing racialized defenses as private litigant preferences revitalizes the
public-private distinction in law and lawyering.188 The reinstantia-
tion of that dichotomy encases criminal defense advocacy in the lib-
eral rhetoric of privacy'8 9 and autonomy.190 Privacy talk shields
racialized advocacy from ethical regulation, effectively granting at-
torneys and their clients immunity from public scrutiny.
No concession of immunity should go unqualified. To the extent
that racialized defenses blend private choice and state enforcement,
they come within the meaning of state action.' 9' In this way, the
defenses expose lawyers and clients to potential liability under anti-
discrimination laws as well as relevant disciplinary codes. The
treatment of nullification, denigration, and diminished capacity ver-
dicts as the reasoned, deliberative products of a democratic commu-
nity fails to insulate lawyers against such liability. Rather, that
treatment obliterates the civic republican ideal of public reason.192
The rhetorical politics of race in fact undermines the principles of
public, reasoned dialogue that stand at the core of civic
republicanism. 93
187. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 363, 366 (1996) ("Color blindness permits racial subordination
to continue by leaving intact institutions created by centuries of official and private oppres-
sion."); see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in An-
tidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1993); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle:
On Rac4 Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1994); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
188. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1992); Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinc-
tion, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 319 (1993); Symposium, The Public-Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
189. Cf. Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119
(1992); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and The Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Violence of Privacy, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 973 (1991).
190. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibili-
ties, 1 YALE. J.L. & FEMNISM 7 (1989); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CnI. L.
REv. 1 (1988).
191. In 1991, the Supreme Court announced that a private party's discriminatory conduct
at trial constitutes state action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
192. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. L.J. 453, 469 (1996).
193. See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory
and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL_ L. REv. 329 (1994); Lawrence
B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 729 (1993).
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B. The Postmodernist Justification
The postmodernist justification of racialized defenses discards
claims of neutrality and stability in law for the contested politics of
ideology.194 Under the postmodem account of lynching ethics, ef-
fective representation heeds what Kenneth Anderson calls the "in-
strumentalist, transactional, mobile ethos of the contemporary
professional." 9 5 That ethos, Anderson remarks, devolves into a
devotion to "purely instrumental technique, without a conception
of or commitment to the social -'ends' of professional knowledge,
except as they are temporarily defined by the market for expert
services."'196 Indeed, for the postmodernist, professional devotion
imposes a duty to muster the "best arguments" on behalf of a cli-
ent' 97 - arguments that, according to Sanford Levinson, amount to
the "crassest, most instrumental" defense possible. 98
Under the racialized defenses of jury nullification, victim deni-
gration, and diminished capacity, the "best argument" gains
credence through white community acceptance. Rendering the
moral quality of legal argument contingent on local community ap-
probation trivializes larger ethical and normative considerations. 199
Lawyering affords no escape from the political and community
commitments of normative judgment. Even when the reduction of
professional service to "technical assistance" tends "to reduce
moral concerns to matters of individual taste, if not idiosyn-
cracy, '200 it leaves the politics of normativity201 in advocacy to col-
lective discernment.
Conceived in personal or collective terms, the postmodern poli-
tics of normativity problematizes the most basic moral aspiration.202
194. See Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRAx cEs 215-29 (Robert L Nelson et al. eds., 1992); Robert L. Nelson & David
M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACICEs, supra, at 177-214; William H. Simon, The Ideology
of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.
195. Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1062, 1073 (1996) (review essay).
196. Id. at 1063.
197. See Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Perform-
ance of Legal Roles, 19 HARv. J. L. & PuB. POLY. 495, 506 (1996).
198. See id.
199. See Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74
TEXAS L. REv. 523, 527-28 (1996).
200. Atkinson, supra note 182, at 186.
201. See Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991).
202. See Blumenson, supra note 199, at 531.
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Implicitly, moral aspiration carries a claim of objective truth.20 3
Parsing that claim, Eric Blumenson notes that however disparaging
of value neutrality, a morality-centered aspirational ethics must still
"presuppose that objectively correct answers exist and that there is
an impartial position from which to distinguish legitimate from ille-
gitimate uses of power. '204
Levinson condemns the objective posture of an aspirational eth-
ics as incapacitating.205 For Levinson, the dismissal of a properly
instrumental legal argument for reasons of illegitimacy, or the con-
ditioning of retainer and representation on the presentation of a
single argument, amounts to incompetence, even if the argument
disposed of makes the lawyer "retch. '206 This instrumental position
suggests not only the acceptance of adversarial norms,20 7 but also
the tolerance of formal neutrality exemplified in the treatment of
race in the courtroom. It also repudiates Michael Tigar's vision of
the false, and apparently rigged, elements of the criminal trial. 208
The clustering of formal, adversarial norms around the purport-
edly neutral, objective practice of racialized defenses confirms
Gunther Teubner's view that norms "'constitute' fields of social ac-
203. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PM-L, & PUB.
As'F. 87, 89 (1996).
204. Blumenson, supra note 199, at 529. The presupposition of objectivity and impartial-
ity also afflicts the experiential decisionmaking of pragmatism. See James R. Hackney, Jr.,
The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products Liability: A Case Study in American
Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 443, 452 (1995) (noting that pragmatists'
"appeal to experience was not a value neutral appeal: the implications of the experience
appealed to by individual pragmatists was shaped by their own value orientation").
205. See Levinson, supra note 197, at 507.
206. Id.
207. See GIBBARD, supra note 174, at 75; Luban & Millemann, supra note 174, at 86-87.
Gibbard observes:
Accepting a norm is something that we do primarily in the context of normative discus-
sion, actual and imaginary. We take positions, and thereby expose ourselves to demands
for consistency. Normative discussion of a situation influences action and emotion in
like situations. It is then that we can speak of norms as governing action and emotion,
and it is through this governance that normative discussion serves to coordinate. Inter-
nalizing a norm is likewise a matter of coordinating propensities, but the propensities are
of a different kind: they work independently of normative discussion.
GIBBARD, supra note 174, at 75.
208. See Michael E. Tigar, Defending, 74 TEXAs L. REv. 101, 109 (1995). Tigar notes:
In the courtroom arena, there is a symbolic equality of defense and prosecution. We
understand that in fact the balance of resources almost always tips in favor of the gov-
ernment, and this is particularly so in high-profile cases where high officials have an-
nounced an intention to take the defendants' lives. The defendant is not given a choice
whether to participate in the unequal contest. The inequality is just another device of
the system-called-justice. The lawyer's job is to expose the device, deploying the signs ofjustice against the signs of system-called-justice. The signs ofjustice include empowering
the jury, calling on the tribunal to respect its oath, exposing contradiction - bringing
out solid reasons why the judge and jurors should go beneath the surface of things.
Id. at 109-10.
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tion," and that such "fields of action in turn reconstitute legal
norms. ''20 9 For the postmodem defender of lynching, adversarial
norms concededly legitimize the language of racial hierarchy and,
hence, reproduce race relations of domination and subordination.
By the same admission, relations of racial superiority and inferiority
reentrench norms of inequality. To break down hierarchical race
relations, the next Part proposes a reconstructed ethic of lynching
defenses based on a commitment to a morality of character and
community grounded in the norms of virtue, citizenship, race con-
sciousness, and spirituality.
IV. LYNCHING ETImcs RECONSTRUCTED
Both Simon and Luban draw on the notion of moral commit-
ment in constructing the concepts of ethical discretion 210 and ac-
tivist counseling.211 Although laudable, these shared visions of
moral action fail to resolve the controversial status of race, racial-
ized strategy, and race-neutral representation in the law and ethics
of criminal defense lawyering. Confronting the status, strategy, and
substance of racial representation in lynching necessitates amplifi-
cation of the ethic of race-conscious responsibility.
The ethic of race-conscious responsibility demands a transfor-
mation of the liberal regime of colorblind criminal defense practice
from the perspective of race. Race-ing the ethics of lynching de-
fenses challenges the identity-making practices of criminal lawyers,
especially the tendency to associate racial difference with deviance
and inferiority and, thus, to reenact racial subordination in advo-
cacy. That challenge requires the reintegration of law, morality,
and legal ethics. Reintegration flows from the adoption of founda-
tional norms and values.
The call for the restoration of values in the legal profession reso-
nates in the current ethics literature.212 The prevailing criminal de-
fense ethics of lynching sustains a thin normative conception of
professionalism deficient in virtue, citizenship, community, and
spirituality. Mired within this conception, alternative notions of
209. Gunther Teubner, Regulatory Law: Chronicle of a Death Foretold, 14 CuRRENT
LEGAL THEoRY 3, 22 (1996).
210. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. RaV. 1083,
1083-84 (1988).
211. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 640-41.
212. See, eg., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATON UNDER LAWYERS: How a CRISIS IN
ma LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T.
KRoNmAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILNG IDEALS OF TmE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
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professionalism213 and regulation214 lapse into repose. The silence
of that repose is attributable to the liberalism-based exclusion of
public moral pronouncement 215 from the lawyer-client relationship.
Liberalism offers a private, contractarian basis for the lawyer-client
relationship that emphasizes the priority of technique, procedure,
and perspectivelessness. 21 6
Envisioning the lawyer-client relationship as a private, contrac-
tual order permits the exploration of certain background regulatory
norms,217 such as reciprocity.218 The norm of reciprocity treats the
racialized defenses of jury nullification, victim denigration, and di-
minished capacity as the efficient, transactional product of lawyer-
client value consensus. Rather than assail the defenses for ineffi-
ciency,219 citing for example the external costs to character and
community, the ethic of race-conscious responsibility attacks the
premise of private, moral consensus as overbroad. On this view,
reciprocity proves counterfactual and moral dialogue degenerates
into an expedient maneuver. The normative embrace of virtue, citi-
zenship, multi-racial community, and spirituality signals the re-
demptive search of moral activism.
A. Virtue
The norm of virtue strengthens the moral content of the ethic of
race-conscious responsibility through legal reasoning and prac-
213. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEmIR
CoMuNITmEs: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 196-217 (1991); Robert W. Gordon &
William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTiCES, supra note 194, at 230-57; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift:
Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1256-63 (1995).
214. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799
(1992).
215. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DIscoNTEN. AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 123-67 (1996) (discussing civic virtue and the public good in the early
American republic).
216. For a discussion of perspectivelessness, see Kimberl6 NV. Crenshaw, Foreword: To-
ward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NATL. BLACK L.J. 1,2 (1989).
217. Cf Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1745,1749-53
(1996).
218. See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2055, 2063 (1996). Pildes contends that the norms of reciprocity contain a specific or
local strand which "sustains ongoing relationships between specific parties ... in direct, one-
to-one interactions... [as well as a generalized strand which] is a more global predisposition
to be motivated by norms of reciprocity and cooperation even when acting in new settings or
with new agents outside some previously established relationship." Id. at 2064 (footnote
omitted).
219. See David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Rela-
tionships, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841, 1848-52 (1996) (claiming that inefficient norms "favor the
members of concentrated interest groups, at the expense of more diffuse members").
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tice. z2 o Cultivating virtue through practical reasoning221 dictates
more than the performance of lawyer role morality.' It requires
seizing upon the expressive function of law.
Many laws, Cass Sunstein comments, contain an expressive
component.223 According to Sunstein, such laws "'make a state-
ment' about how much, and how, a good or bad should be val-
ued."224  The statement materializes in the form of "social
meanings, social norms, and social roles."225 By design, this mate-
rial valuation alters existing norms and shapes external behavior.226
The logic of this expressive influence depends on a shared sense of
appropriate normative direction.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules combine expressive
functions and justifications. The regulatory decrees of lawyer com-
petence and candor illustrate these common tendencies. For exam-
ple, the Model Rules mandate "competent representation" of a
client, specifying the "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary" to satisfy the nature and circum-
stances of a disputed matter.227 Justification for requisite levels of
attention and preparation rests on the gravity of "what is at
stake." Additionally, the Model Rules require lawyer candor to-
ward the tribunal and, to a lesser degree, the opposing party and
counsel. 22 9 Justification of the duty of candor obtains from the obli-
gation "to avoid implication in the commission of perjury or other
falsification of evidence. 12 30 This obligation allegedly ensures fair
competition in the adversarial procedure of marshalling contested
evidence.231
220. Se4 e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, When Silence Screams, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1785
(1996); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of-Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NoTRE DAME LAW-
YER 231 (1979).
221. See J. David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, 106 Ermcs 694 (1996)
(defining the object and justification of practical reasoning).
222. See Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REv. 853,
947-77 (1992).
223. See Sunstein, supra note 174, at 964.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. MODEL Ru.ns OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr Rule 1.1 (1995); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RnspoNsmIury DR 6-101 (1980).
228. MODEL RuLs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.1 cmt. (1995).
229. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr at Rules 3.3, 3.4 (1995).
230. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.3 cmt. (1995).
231. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.4 cmt. (1995).
1093February 1997]
Michigan Law Review
Despite the expressive force and influence of lawyer compe-
tence and candor decrees, misconduct in the prosecution 232 and de-
fense of criminal proceedings continues, especially with respect to
race .3 3 The persistence of lawyer misconduct suggests that the pos-
itivist discourse that pervades the Model Code and Model Rules
lacks a shared sense of appropriate normative direction sufficient to
foster moral virtue.234 Revitalizing lawyers' sense of virtue through
legal education and skills training is likely to prove futile. Put
starkly, the standard conventions of legal education and training af-
ford little opportunity for the experiential learning and critical re-
flection needed to inculcate virtue. Even with the benefit of such
opportunity, the resulting sense of professional virtue, backed by a
law-induced vision of justice, falls subject to widespread public
suspicion.235
Practical wisdom stocks no means to rescue virtue from the im-
poverished training of legal education. If virtue is to be salvaged, it
will be recovered from the values of citizenship, multi-racial com-
munity, and spirituality.23 6 Each of these spheres provides a source
of identity crucial to the attainment of virtue. Kenneth Anderson
asserts the importance of the individual possession and develop-
ment of "diverse and cross-cutting identities" extracted from the
multiple domains (such as religion and family) of civil society.237
For Anderson, ethical conduct "depends upon the possession of
strong identities outside the profession. '238 Representing race with
competence and candor hinges on the strength of attorney-client
identities outside of the law and ethics of lawyering.
The identity-making power of citizenship, community, and spiri-
tuality builds moral character and virtue from sources outside the
law.239 Like the practice of criminal defense representation, the
practice of virtue in advocacy entails both competence and candor.
232. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDnAM L. REV. 851, 890-910 (1995).
233. See Elizabeth L. Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror. An Approach to the
Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1212 (1992).
234. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for
Thirst?, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL E'mcs 311 (1987); Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Be-
yond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOwA L. REV. 901 (1995).
235. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69 S. CAL
L. REv. 47, 83 (1995).
236. On the virtue ethics tradition, see Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good
Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL L. Rv. 885 (1996).
237. Anderson, supra note 195, at 1072.
238. Id.
239. Endorsing the turn to virtue ethics in the discussion of lawyerly professional respon-
sibility, Atkinson urges that:
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Competence alone, however, furnishes no moral assurance of ad-
vancing a greater social good.240 Candor at least proffers an "open-
ness to others" 241 essential to the creation of a racially diverse
community.242
B. Citizenship
The norm of citizenship contributes a transformative notion of
community obligation to the ethic of race-conscious responsibility.
Although political, the norm betrays doubts about the suitability of
lawyers' political judgments. 243 The political character of the norm
instead pertains to the meaning of lawyer community participation
in matters of democratic citizenship that cut across racial lines.
The norm of citizenship encourages lawyer crosscutting commu-
nity participation in an effort to achieve a fuller individual sense of
collective, multiracial identity. Unlike David Abraham's "complete
citizen," 244 the lawyer-citizen seeks more than a "relatively unfet-
tered" sense of community membership and self-governance. 245 In-
deed, he seeks the richness of racially diverse citizenship, not
merely a state of relative self-sufficiency.246
[WV]e must widen our perspective from a focus on particular acts, whether the acts are
conceived in terms of their agent's motives or their effects on others. We must include
the agent's general dispositions, vices, and virtues-in a word, his or her character. In
focusing on character and its development, we see how we are made to do what we do,
and, conversely, how what we do and why we do it make us who we are. Most impor-
tantly, we learn who we want to be.
Atkinson, supra note 182, at 217 (footnotes omitted).
240. John DiPippa observes that the loss of moral community deprives a lawyer of the
moral assurance that his work offers morally efficacious service. See John M.A. DiPippa,
Lon Fuller, the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 303, 356 (1996).
241. Atkinson, supra note 182, at 220; see also J. Kevin Quinn et al., Resisting the Individ-
ualistic Flavor of Opposition to Model Rule 3.3, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 901 (1995).
242. Cf. Vogelman, supra note 125, at 575 (insisting that "[a]rguments catering to racism
or other prejudices are not legally relevant and surely assault the dignity of our courts and
are degrading toward our system of justice" (footnote omitted)). See generally, Colin Croft,
Note, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A -Proposal for Deliberative Moral
Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1256, 1321-51 (1992).
243. Eisgruber explains: -
It is not obvious that lawyers are especially good at reading [constitutional] credos or
that they know more than most people about things that a constitutional credo might
describe-values, aspirations and characteiistics of political identity. The conventions of
the profession might actually deaden the political sensibilities of lawyers, making them
especially ill-suited to read credos.
Eisgruber, supra note 235, at 83.
244. David Abraham, Liberty without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a
"Negative Citizenship" Regime 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 51 (1996).
245. Id.; see also JuDrrH N. SHKLa1,A AmmcAN CrrTzENSHIP: TaE QUEsT FOR INCLU-
SION (1991); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL E-mcs 241 (1992).
246. On self-sufficiency and citizenship, see James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic
Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The Troubling Case of Workfar 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103,
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The concept of citizenship enlivening the lawyer-citizen ideal
reaches beyond the private, self-identity of the sovereign subject to
hold up a public, racially integrated version of the self. Frederick
Dolan finds the self "constituted through a plurality of judgments
and narratives of others." 247 For Dolan, this public self is a product
of the "plural and variable character of human interaction, espe-
cially symbolic or discursive interaction. '248 Even when that inter-
action embroils the dichotomies of racial hierarchy, this public self
may acquire what Dolan describes as "a distinctive, coherent, and
stable identity."249 According to this analysis, identity evolves
through language and intersubjective action. The presence of an
alternative, public self demonstrates the "linguistic and interpretive
character of identity."250
The public, self-identity of the lawyer-citizen gives rise to broad
community obligations in criminal defense practice. Those obliga-
tions include the building and strengthening of interracial commu-
nities.251 Although the communitarian account of race and
community is underdeveloped,25 2 its component elements of social
deliberation and public-private partnership show transformative
potential.253
C. Race Consciousness
The norm of race consciousness forms the core of the ethic of
race-conscious responsibility. This norm stands against the vio-
lently contested history of race consciousness in American law.2S4
114-49 (1996); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE
L.J. 1563 (1996) (book review).
247. Frederick M. Dolan, Political Action and the Unconscious: Arendt and Lacan on
Decentering the Subject, 23 PotL THEORY 330, 342 (1995).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 343.
251. See John A. Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80
MINN. L. REv. 749, 791-92 (1996) ("Integration makes it possible for those historically ex-
cluded from participating in society to be part of a larger community, while necessarily trans-
forming that community.").
252. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609 (1988); Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law
Reform for African-Americans?, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1209 (1994); Stephen M. Feldman,
Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEo. LJ. 1835 (1992).
253. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Trans-
formation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1995).
254. See RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
AMERICA AND RACE (1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, supra note 87; T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, The Constitution in ContexL The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 COLO. L.
REv. 325 (1992); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758; see also Jonathan
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The upshot of this contest finds articulation in the "racial rule of
differentiation." 2s5 While subordination often accompanies the ap-
plication of the rule of differentiation, differentiation itself does not
necessarily imply subordination. Nor does the dissonance of racial
identity carry such an implication.
The norm of race consciousness hinges on a commitment to
multiracial community that honors differentiation and diversity as
integral parts of collective dialogue. That commitment urges the
exploration of hate speech regulation,2S6 especially when commu-
nity sentiment veers toward violence. The interpretive and physical
violence embodied in the racialized defenses of jury nullification,
victim denigration, and diminished capacity extends the instant
realm of hate speech regulation to the rhetoric of the courtroom.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the regulation of law-
yers' courtroom speech from restrictions on lawyers' extra-judicial
statements.Z 7 In contrast to the regulation of extra-judicial com-
ment, the regulation of courtroom speech instigates broad fear of
constitutional intrusion. 258 Allaying this fear requires a race-
conscious defense of state intervention in the private and public ex-
ercise of speech rights.259
In this light, consider Owen Fiss's recent defense of state ac-
tion.260 Fiss conceives of the "state as parliamentarian," contending
Feldman, Race-Consciousness Versus Colorblindness in the Selection of Civil Rights Leaders:
Reflections upon Jack Greenberg's Crusaders in the Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 151 (1996) (re-
view essay).
255. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudenc 105 YALE L.J. 1, 36-75 (1995).
256. Se4 e.g., WoRDs THAT WouND (Mar Matsuda et al. eds., 1993); Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE,
SPEAKING OF SE)X: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL Riolrs, AND Crvn. LmERTES 17 (Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. et al. eds., 1995).
257. Cf. Marcy Strauss, From Witness to Riches: The Constitutionality of Restricting Wit-
ness Speech, 38 Amz. L. REv. 291 (1996); Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the After-
math of Gentile: Reconsidering the Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 494
(1993).
258. On the shared social critique of First Amendment doctrine by prewar and post-war
progressives, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DuE LJ. 375; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive
Social Thought, 74 TExAs L. REv. 951 (1996).
259. Such a defense addresses state sanctioned acts of racial discrimination as forms of
state action, rather than as "'neutral background'" facts. Roberts, supra note 187, at 390.
260. Fiss observes:
In intervening in this manner, the state is protecting the speech rights of the blacks,
and it can do so only by restricting the range of speech acts in which racists are allowed
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that the First Amendment principle of democratic self-governance
"does not protect merely choice by citizens, but rather choice made
with adequate information and under suitable conditions of reflec-
tion. ' 261 To the extent that racialized defenses constitute an unin-
formed and unreflective hate-speech-inspired choice of lawyer and
client citizens, the justification for governmental regulation gathers
force.262
Nevertheless, some may object that application of the rule of
racial differentiation to regulate hate speech constitutes an " 'inva-
sive preference.' "263 Pointing to the lawyer-client relationship,
Luban defines an invasive preference as "an individual preference
for an option that someone else has excluded as a matter of
right.' ' 264 He finds evidence of invasive preference when a lawyer
overrides the stated preference of a client. Override, Cathy Mans-
field suggests, may consist of the "act of taking utilitarian control of
a client's story by placing legal construct upon it."'265 Construed as
an act of client domination, utilitarian control may arise in other
substantive law areas outside of the criminal law.266 Whatever the
substantive law at stake, the crux of hate speech regulation con-
cerns securing voluntary lawyer-client agreement to refrain from
harmful, racialized rhetoric. The next section examines the possi-
bility of reaching such agreement through shared spirituality.
to engage. In favoring the speech rights of blacks in this way, the state is not making ajudgment about the merit - constitutional or other - of the views each side is likely to
express, through "fighting words" or otherwise, but only that this sector of the commu-
nity must be heard from more fully if the public is to make an informed choice about an
entire range of issues on the public agenda, from affirmative action, to education, to
welfare policy. The state is acting as a parliamentarian trying to end a pattern of behav-
ior that silences one group and thus distorts or skews public debate. The state is not
trying to usurp the public's right of collective self-determination, but rather to enhance
the public's capacity to properly exercise that right.
Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAPrrAL U. L. REV. 281,
288 (1995).
261. Id. at 288-89.
262. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Cn. L. REv. 413 (1996).
263. David Luban, Social Choice Theory as Jurisprudence, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 551
(1996).
264. Id.
265. Mansfield, supra note 46, at 918. Mansfield argues: "The act of taking utilitarian
control of a client's story by placing legal construct upon it is legitimate only if the attorney
distills and interprets the client's story toward the client's goal." Id. at 918 (footnote
omitted).
266. See George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REv. 347 (1996).
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D. Spirituality
The norm of spirituality completes the ethic of race-conscious
responsibility. Contemporary writing on ethics evinces a turn to
spirituality in law and the legal profession.267 A similar shift is visi-
ble in the medical profession.268 In jurisprudence, however, the
shift marks a departure from formalism and instrumentalism
prompted by the search for values absent from or external to law.269
Images of spirituality in law may be traced to "the prophetic
vision of justice" in American legal culture.270 The desire for spiri-
tual fulfillment fills that vision, moving from the ground up out of
the drive for self-alteration and context-transcendence in the pur-
suit of human flourishing,271 a pursuit basic to the human character.
Transcendence involves more than the self. At bottom, spiritu-
ality is tied to the notion of communion and community-building. 272
Without communion with others, the investigation of alternative
types of relationships that neither devalue nor exclude race makes
no progress. Indeed, the very concept of personhood is contingent
on the flourishing of interracial community.273
267. See, eg., RADICAL CMUSTIAN AND EXEMPLARY LAWYER (Andrew W. McThenia,
Jr. ed., 1995); Anthony E. Cook, The Spiritual Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1007; Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1259
(1996); Thomas L Shaffer, Maybe A Lawyer Can Be A Servang If Not.... 27 TEX. TECH. L.
REv. 1345 (1996).
268. See, eg., Russell B. Connors, Jr. & Martin L. Smith, Religious Insistence on Medical
Treatment: Christian Theology and Re-Imagination, HASTIwNs CENTR REP., July-Aug. 1996,
at 23.
269. See George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence, 29
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 545, 575 (1996) (rejecting both formalism and neo-Wittgensteinian ap-
proaches for their refusal to justify decisions on the basis of values external to law or results).
270. Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle 80 ComRNLL L. REv. 1331,
1353 (1995) (claiming that "the prophetic litigator's main contribution is aiding the develop-
ment of a culture of legal struggle that continually informs and inspires future generations to
challenge oppressive practices").
271. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Ar-
istotelian Essentialism, 20 PoL. THEORY 202, 214-23 (1992) (discussing the conditions of
human flourishing).
272. See Paul J. Heald, Idealism and the Individual Woman: Madness and Humanity in
Bessie Head's A Question of Power, 5 Tnx. J. WomEN & L. 83, 98-99 (1995).
273. Jane Baron and Jeffrey Dunoff note: "If the flourishing self is constituted in relation
to things and people, then personhood and community are connected; the individual is partly
a product of his or her social world." Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market
Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARnozo L. REv.
431, 475 (1996).
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The overarching morality of community resides in the general
obligation to reconcile competing visions of the common good.
This obligation requires lawyers and clients to combat moral disas-
sociation 274 and to eschew narrow self-interest in advocacy. Only a
reconstructive morality reconciling individual rights and social re-
sponsibilities satisfies that obligation.275
Drawn from the jurisprudence of critical race theory,276 the re-
constructive ethic of race-conscious responsibility reasserts the role
of lawyers as custodians of community.277 This custodial responsi-
bility requires entry into spiritual dialogue with clients and commu-
nities to establish respect for conscience in opposing racial
animus.278 Fashioned from an ethic of care279 increasingly cele-
brated in ethics regimes,280 spiritual dialogue brings the potential
for compassion281 and empathy into the play of advocacy. Doubt-
less forestalling the conversion of caring into coercion or paternal-
ism poses challenges.2s2 Institutionalizing the ethic of care in state
juridical structures presents even greater challenges. 283
274. See LAURENCE MORDEKHAI THOMAS, VESSELS OF EVIL: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
THE HOLOCAUST 108-13 (1993).
275. See Amitai Etzioni, A Moderate Communitarian Proposal, 24 PoL THEORY 155,161
(1996) (maintaining that "individual rights and social responsibilities, just like individual lib-
erties and social definitions of the common good, are not oppositional but complementary -
or at least they can made to be").
276. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990).
277. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1066-67
(1990); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. Cai. L. REV. 835, 873 (1987).
278. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE
INNOCENT 111-33 (1981); Emily Fowler Hartigan, Multiple Unities in the Law, 36 S. TEx. L.
REV. 999 (1995).
279. See, e.g., VIRGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY: TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SocI-
ETY, AND POLImCS 30-31,52-54, 168-70 (1993); JUSTICE AND CARE: ESSENTIAL READINGS IN
FEMINIST ETmics (Virginia Held ed., 1995); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE AP-
PROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION (1984); ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMININE AND FEMi-
NIsT ETICS 80-107 (1993).
280. See e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J.
2665 (1993).
281. See Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism:
Resurrecting the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEo. L.J. 1431 (1994).
282. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What's Gender Got to Do with it?: The Politics and
Morality of an Ethic of Care, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 265, 285 (1996) (reviewing
JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE
(1993)).
283. See Christopher H. Wellman, Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy, 25
PHIL. & Pun. AFu. 211,213-14 (1996) (arguing that the political legitimacy of state imposition
upon personal liberty turns not merely on the services it provides to the individual but on the
benefits it provides others).
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E. Objections
The ethic of race-conscious responsibility spurs multiple objec-
tions. Rather than rehearse past exceptions,284 this section briefly
considers four rapidly emerging objections. The first condemns the
imposition of constraints on a criminal defendant's freedom of
choice in formulating a defense strategy.285 The second assails the
same constraints for encumbering a criminal defendant's right to
trial.2 8 6 The third bemoans the heightened danger of lawyer bad
faith in counseling and negotiation,2, 7 particularly concerning mat-
ters of plea bargaining and accelerated disposition.288 The fourth
criticizes the introduction of additional counseling variables for in-
creasing the risk of incurable error.
Each of these four objections deserves more elaborate treat-
ment than is available in this brief article. Nonetheless, the rough
contours of a suitable response may be sketched here. Protests re-
garding feared impediments on a criminal defendant's freedom of
choice in devising a defense strategy, however well intentioned,
must concede that client freedom is not ordinarily unfettered. De-
fensive strategy effectively rests on the discretionary judgments of
lawyer counsel. The content of that counsel is subject to greater
regulation from statutory code and court sanction than from client
ministration.
Moreover, disquiet over the hindering of a criminal defendant's
right to trial, while legitimate, seems exaggerated. The proposed
ethic does nothing to disturb a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial. Rather, the ethic limits the tactics obtain-
able at trial. Those tactics already fall under the constraining
ethical supervision and evidentiary governance of courts.
Further, worry about the danger of lawyer bad faith in counsel-
ing and negotiation, albeit well placed, appears prematlire. No
procurable evidence, empirical or anecdotal, implies bad faith.
Neither does the analogy to plea bargaining, and its associated mis-
conduct, offer a basis for such a presumption.
284. See Alfieri, supra note 32, at 1339-40.
285. See Stephen . Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Pro-
moting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for
All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. Crum. L. REv. 73 (1993).
286. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Al-
ternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 931 (1983).
287. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 595
(1993).
288. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion As Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 53-60 (1988).
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Finally, unease concerning the introduction of additional coun-
seling variables, and a corresponding increase in the risk of error,
seems groundless. No evidence suggests an escalation of risk. And
no presumption of risk finds empirical support. In spite of this in-
sufficiency, the grave consequences of ineffective assistance compel
a review of preventive measures, such as enhanced training and su-
pervision in counseling practices.
Beyond this truncated response, the above-mentioned objec-
tions warrant consideration of the institutional competence of
courts and bar associations in promulgating and enforcing regula-
tions governing the racial conduct of lawyers and clients in criminal
defense advocacy. Consideration extends to the enumeration of
formal procedural protections designed to safeguard against race-
based prejudice in the courtroom and the law office. Implementa-
tion of such protections requires new administrative systems and
gives rise to the related problems of cost and valuation.
To be sure, the task of assigning a pecuniary value to the defor-
mation of racial identity or monetizing harm to racial community is
daunting. Because the nature of the injury is intangible in charac-
ter, it exceeds the scope of easy economic calculation. Likewise,
the task of comparing the actual moral worth or culpability of cli-
ents and communities presents alarming difficulties. 289 Neverthe-
less, roughhewn assessment and open discussion of the potential
costs and benefits of racial regulation in the criminal justice system
deserves our attention.
CONCLUSION
This article advances a larger, multipronged investigation of ra-
cial truth and justice in the criminal defense representation of his-
torical agents of American racial violence. Like prior efforts in this
investigation, the article is plagued by an admitted tension between
modernist intuition and postmodernist disposition. Lisa Frohmann
and Elizabeth Mertz remark that this tension is likely to emerge
whenever "analysis moves all events to the level of discourse, sto-
ries, and social categories, turning away completely from questions
of truth and justice while concentrating on issues of construction,
persuasion, and rhetoric. ' '290 Although the discursive or rhetorical
analysis of racialized criminal defense narratives remains critical,
289. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 455, 462 (1996).
290. Lisa Frohmann & Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Reform and Social Construction: Violence,
Gender, and the Law, 19 L. & Soc. INOUnRY 829, 847, 849 n.66 (1994).
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lawyers should not, indeed cannot, turn away from the pursuit of
truth and justice in evaluating race in America.
The evaluation of the status of race, racialized defense strategy,
and race-neutral representation in the law and ethics of criminal
defense lawyering suffers profound ambiguity in part born of the
tension between modernism and postmodernism within the CRT
movement. Angela Harris observes that the dual* commitment of
race-crits to the modernist, antiracist goals of traditional civil rights
scholarship and to the postmodernist, deconstructive methods of in-
ternal critique produces different, perhaps incommensurable, inter-
pretive accounts of the legal subject and the practices of objectivity
and neutrality in legal reasoning.291 Embodied in varied narrative
forms, the accounts undermine common faith in Enlightenment
reason and popular belief in historical truth. Rather than revive the
canons of modernism or reject the critical tools of postmodemism,
Harris urges race-crits not only to "inhabit" or "live in the tension"
generated by modern-postmodern jurisprudential ambiguity, but
also to take hold of its reconstructive potential.292
Here, as well as in other remedial contexts of normative pre-
scription, modern-postmodern jurisprudential ambiguity confounds
the practical investigation of race, particularly study of the in-
grained lawyer habits of race-baiting and the discursive traces of
racist ideology in advocacy. CRT scholars studying racial remedies,
for example, note conceptual uncertainty in the competing notions
of affirmative action and discrimination. Indeed, Girardeau Spann
notes that unstable goals and mixed motives may sometimes erase
the difference between affirmative action and discrimination.293
Like justice-based remedial measures, advocacy strategies some-
times require redefinition. The project of redefinition entails a dis-
trust of tradition verging on self-paternalism. The growing cry for
the regulation of the self in advocacy signals the move to nonmate-
rial, psychological claims of spiritual redress294 on behalf of clients
and their communities. Engaging the narratives of individuals and
communities of color in critical dialogue demands an understanding
of both black and white racial identity. Ultimately, only an under-
291. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword. The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL L.
REv. 741, 745-60 (1994).
292. See iL at 760.
293. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 65
(1995).
294. See generally Kathy Laster & Pat O'Malley, Sensitive New-age Laws: The Reasser-
tion of Emotionality in Law, 24 INr. J. Soc. L. 21, 28 (1996).
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standing of the politics of identity will break the silence of racial
subordination in law and ethics.295
295. Anthony Chase urges breaking "the precious rule of silence" in law. Chase, supra
note 87, at 47. He remarks: "The day may come when race will no longer be an issue, but
that will be after the process of restructuring our collective unconscious is completed - after
the seeds of racism, instilled centuries ago, have been eradicated." Id.
